**Age and Generational Differences as a Factor of Variety in Notions of the Country’s Development**

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The issue of age and generational differences in the modern Russian context gained its relevance during the discussion on the protest actions of 2017–2019. Some sociological studies show that the social composition of the protesters switched from the middle class in 2011-2012 towards younger people, whose income level is below average, and the claims are of a socio-economic nature. The political generations approach is based on the fact that due to the differences in life conditions of individuals during the so-called "formative years", that is, until the age of about 17 years, their political attitudes are formed in different ways. In particular, R. Inglehart considers the circumstances of socialization to be drivers of a change in values, which is accompanied by a generations change formed by different conditions of socialization.

The purpose of our research is to identify age and generation differences in assessing the general state of affairs in the country. The research hypothesis is that representatives of later generations and respondents from later age cohorts are more critical of the situation in the country, and that age and generational differences are more pronounced in later waves of the study, after the summer of 2018, which is called the threshold for the civic engagement of the young.

To test the hypothesis, we used data from the Levada Center's Courier survey for 2005–2019, namely, 9 survey waves conducted in June 2005, 2007, 2009, 2011, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2017, and 2019. The dependent variable is the overall satisfaction with the political course, measured by the following question: “Do you think that the country is generally going in the right direction today, or does it seem to you that the country is moving in the wrong direction?” with the answer option “things are going in the right direction” and “the country is moving on the wrong way”. For this variable, two series of binary logistic regression models were built, in one of which the independent variable was age (age groups under 25, 25 to 35, 35 to 45, 45 to 55, 55 to 65 , more than 65 years old), in another, generations (the generation of millennials - born after 1981, the reform generation - born in 1968-1981, the generation of stagnation - in 1947-1967, the generation of the thaw - in 1939-1946, mobilization generation - before 1938). In both series of models, Gender, size of settlement, income level, and level of education were included as control variables.

As a result of the research, the hypothesis was partially confirmed. The effect of age turned out to be statistically significant; however, during the period 2007–2017, its direction did not change. During this period, young people under 25 were more appreciative of the political course of the state. On the contrary, after 2018, the year of the supposed change in the polarity of age-generational orientations, in 2019, respondents under the age of 25 become, on average, significantly more critical of it than the representatives of the next older group aged between 25-35 years. Thus, the expectations that younger cohorts would demonstrate more critical attitudes were confirmed only by the data from 2019. The revealed intergenerational differences are that from 2007 to 2017, millennials, as a reference category for the generational measurement of value differences, were more loyal than reform generation 1968–1981 2007 to 2011 Millennials remained significantly more loyalist than the previous generation. Between 2005 and 2017, the least loyal generation was precisely the reform generation. At the same time, the most appreciative generation was that of stagnation. The situation changed in 2019, when millennials became significantly more critical than the reform generation. Moreover, the previously most strongly appreciative generation of stagnation has become the most highly critical one.

Thus, the nature of age and generational differences in general assessments of the country's current development in recent years has changed significantly, and non-linearly: attitudes of representatives of the youngest and one of the older generations have become relatively more critical, so that the generation between them, from the relatively more critical ones, has become the most appreciative.