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**Factors Determining Legislative Duration in the European Union
(Quantitative Analysis)**

This article investigates the impact of various institutional factors on the duration of legislative process negotiations in the European Union. The spatial analysis and the closely related theory of veto players form the conceptual basis of the study. The empirical data consists of EU secondary law directives adopted in 1990-2019 (1124 directives) extracted from EU official legislation database EUR-LEX. We use the methodology of survival analysis (Cox model).

We find out that after 2004, the rules of voting in the Council (unanimity or qualified majority) do not affect the duration of the legislative process; this conclusion radically changes the traditional vision of the functioning of the Council.

We prove that of all the EU enlargements, only that of 1995 has influenced the legislative process (slowdown). Other EU enlargements did not have a significant impact. We should emphasize that the 2004 enlargement did not negatively influenced on the EU decision-making process, despite all political and academic concerns. If even the accession of ten CEE countries complicated the decision-making process, this effect was overcompensated by the development of cooperative practices between EU institutions (trilogues).

We show that of all basic treaty reforms that have taken place since 1990, only the Amsterdam Treaty has accelerated the decision-making process. In addition, we conclude that the Interinstitutional Agreement of 2007 between the Council and the European Parliament had a stronger impact on the legislative process than most treaty reforms. It favoured the acceleration of decision-making by consolidating cooperative practices between EU institutions based on trilogues. These scientific results are fundamentally new.

Besides, our study confirms some previous conclusions on the new dataset: more active involvement of the European Parliament in the legislative process (ordinary legislative procedure), the novelty and complexity of the act slow down the decision-making process.